Climate Change and International Distributive Justice by Gašparić, Petra
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF RIJEKA 
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Petra Gašparić 
Climate Change and International Distributive 
Justice 
M.A. Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Rijeka, September 2016 
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF RIJEKA 
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Climate Change and International Distributive 
Justice 
M.A. Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
Mentors: dr.sc. Elvio Baccarini, dr.sc. Nebojša Zelić 
Student: Petra Gašparić 
Student's Identification Number: 0009059144 
Major: Philosophy and English language and literature, Master's 
 
 
Rijeka, September 2016 
  
 
Abstract 
 
Climate change is the problem we hear about more and more often. We 
hear about the damages it causes, as well as the discussions about how to deal 
with those detrimental effects. The problem is of international interest because 
what causes climate change and its negative effects (usually emissions of waste 
gases in rich countries) is regularly felt in poor parts of the world. In contrary, in 
most cases, poor states haven't contributed to climate change harms and don't 
have enough resources to deal with them. This situation obviously requires 
adverting to the issues of justice, namely global distributive justice.  
The paper aims at finding an appropriate distributive principle for 
allocating the benefits and burdens of climate change. In that respect, I argue 
that egalitarian approach doesn't give a complete and suitable response to the 
climate change problem. As an alternative approach to that, I find the minimalist 
account, and corresponding distributive principles (the polluter pays and ability 
to pay principles) more successful in resolving issues linked to climate change 
and accounting the questions of fair distribution.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The main issue discussed in this paper concerns the problem of human-
induced climate change and its relation to international distributive justice. 
Anthropogenic climate change raises many ethical and political issues, and the 
one that I will explore refers to the question of fair or just distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of climate change mitigation and adaptation among 
responsible state and non-state actors. Namely, in the context of climate change, 
the question of international justice pertains to the problem how to allocate the 
benefits and burdens of using the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb human waste 
gases, i.e. greenhouse gases (GHG), which represent the detrimental effect of 
human interference with the climate system. When applying principles of 
distributive justice to the problem of climate change, the central question is who 
should bear the responsibility for the harmful effects caused by climate change, 
as well as the costs of their reduction. There is a serious problem of an 
inequitable allocation of the atmosphere as a global commons among developed 
and developing states that calls for the establishment of a just and fair climate 
change regime that will amend those inequities. Related to this, moral and 
political philosophers have tried to give solutions in terms of determining a fair 
distributive principle applicable to the issue of climate change.  
In this text I will touch upon different normative challenges this issue 
raises, as well as try to give my opinion regarding the question which 
distributive principle or a combination of principles is the most successful in 
confronting the distributive issue of climate change. So, this paper is structured 
as follows: first, I will introduce the problem of climate change and how it 
relates to the international distributive justice, and set the framework for the 
discussion in relation to two main approaches to global distributive justice – 
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egalitarian and minimalist. Secondly, I will determine the scope of international 
distributive justice in regard to the main subject of distribution, and the actors 
responsible for anthropogenic climate change. Thirdly, I will explain time-slice 
and historical distributive principles and try to apply them in the context of 
climate change. With respect to that, equal per capita emissions shares and 
historical accountability approach, i.e. the polluter pays principle (PPP) will be 
addressed. Then I shall present main objections directed to the PPP; responses to 
the listed objections and defend the view according to which the PPP (or 
'beneficiary pays principle' as a more appropriate version of the PPP) has to be 
supplemented with an additional principle, and that is the ability to pay 
principle. Finally, I shall examine three different formulations of the ability to 
pay principle (Caney's hybrid account, Shue's proposal, Miller's principle of 
equal sacrifice) and argue that their positions, as combinations of historical 
account (PPP/BPP) and the ability to pay approach to the distributive issues of 
climate change, are the most plausible solutions to the posed problem.  
I support the view that the mere historical accountability isn’t sufficient 
for bearing the costs of climate change mitigation, but the responsible actors 
should also have the capacity, i.e. financial ability to cope with the climate 
change burdens. Likewise, Caney's, Shue's and Miller's solutions refer to the 
importance of promoting basic human rights as a crucial aspect of dealing with 
climate change, i.e. they endorse the minimalist approach to global distributive 
justice that I consider to be a preferable one, as opposed to the egalitarian 
approach. 
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2. International distributive justice 
 
Traditional discussion of distributive justice is mainly concerned with the 
distribution of wealth or some other good (usually related to the economic 
sphere) among the present members of some nation-state. In other words, it is 
''confined'' within state borders and relevant for the citizens of a particular 
country. In accordance with that, one of the most important political 
philosophers, John Rawls, advocates the following view, depicted by Charles R. 
Beitz:  
''Rawls holds that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as 
international distributive justice. Individual states, which he takes to 
be the basic agents in the global normative order, are not obligated 
to achieve and maintain any definite global distribution of wealth.''1  
For some time, international or global justice wasn't something that 
philosophers paid attention to when it comes to the distributive issues. 
Conversely, they were primarily focused on the domestic realm and how to 
share a particular good among individual members of some society. In addition 
to this, there has been long denial among philosophers that conceptions of 
justice from domestic context can be applied internationally. They have 
emphasized the central reason for that to be the lack of a 'global government' or 
some other institution that will have sovereign authority for making political 
decisions and a power of enforcing them. As Beitz contends, at the domestic 
level there is a structure regulated by principles of political justice, which is 
comprised of a shared control over decision-making, as well as the restrictions 
regarding the state's authority to make political decisions. He further emphasizes 
the essential problem that there is no such structure present at the global level. 
There isn't any analogous sovereign power, legislature or coercive institution 
                                                          
1 Beitz (2005), p. 20. 
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necessary for the regulation of the political decisions on how to distribute some 
good among different nation-states.2 But, is the mentioned coercive institution or 
another form of an authority necessary for global distributive justice to come 
about? Should we limit distributive justice to the state level because there is no 
formal global government?  
According to Chris Armstrong, two opposing approaches can be 
advocated in respect to the posed question. First, relational approach suggests 
that there should be some kind of a relationship between people (e.g. shared 
institution, citizenship or government), for distributive justice to become 
relevant.3 We can call this position a strong version of relational approach 
because the requirement of such form of a relationship rejects the very idea of 
global distributive justice. Since there is no formal institution at the global level 
or common world citizenship, therefore we cannot hold the concept of global 
justice relevant. Furthermore, as Armstrong asserts, there are other accounts of 
relational approach. For example, somewhat weaker versions tell us that it is 
enough that people share a single world, or that distributive justice is relevant 
because people affect each other's lives outside their nation borders.4 I think that 
this account of relational approach is more convenient regarding the present 
issues and problems in the international relations because it doesn't set such 
strict requirement for global distributive justice as the strong version. 
Nevertheless, relationists are quite determined in setting a specific institutional 
relationship as a condition for principles of justice to be valid at the global level.  
In respect to that, I find non-relational approach to be more suitable 
approach because it gives us quite persuasive reasons to hold global justice 
necessary and relevant. According to Armstrong, non-relational approach gives 
us less stringent requirement for global justice to come about. The fact that what 
                                                          
2 Beitz (2005), p. 24. 
3 Armstrong (2012), p. 25. 
4 Ibid., p. 27. 
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people share by virtue of being human is satisfying for principles of justice to 
impose global distributive duties on people.5 In the following quotation, 
Armstrong remarks the key point of non-relational approach to global 
distributive justice: 
''In contrast to relational approaches, non-relational approaches 
typically suggest that humans have entitlements simply as humans, 
and not because we happen to share certain institutions, for 
example. They suggest that our humanity, or dignity, ought to be 
respected, and that doing so has distributive implications.''6 
 I consider non-relational approach to global justice to be superior to the 
relational one for the following two reasons, acknowledged by Armstrong. First, 
today the world is more connected than before and although there is no formal 
global government (necessary for relational account), organizations such as 
World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the UN, as well as various 
international conventions, can be considered to constitute some form of a shared 
global institutional order, required for the regulation of international distribution 
of goods.7 Second,  a feature of non-relational approach which I deem to be of 
great importance is a reference to human rights. Namely, basic human rights 
extend beyond borders and exist irrespective of some shared institution or 
government. Thus, non-relationists think that we should create a global 
institutional order that will secure the fulfillment of basic human rights. Also, 
the fact of our humanity is sufficient for people to have global distributive duties 
and entitlements, with an aim of meeting at least minimal conditions for a decent 
life.8  
                                                          
5 Armstrong (2012), p. 25.,30. 
6 Ibid., p. 30. 
7 Ibid., p. 28. 
8 Ibid., p. 30. 
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Moreover, the emphasis on the notions such as duties and rights or 
entitlements is important because generally speaking, the principles of 
distributive justice give us guidance for a just allocation of the benefits and 
burdens connected to a certain good that is shared between people. In respect to 
that, the benefits correspond to our entitlements to a shared good, and the 
burdens usually correspond to our duties of justice, i.e. what are we liable to do 
in order to have a fair distribution.9 To give an example, we are entitled to food 
and water in order to sustain life (basic human right to subsistence), and if a 
group of people lacks subsistence goods, others should have a duty to provide 
them with these goods.   
Although in many cases of international relations there are various 
impediments on solving problems because of the lack of coercive institutions 
analogous to the ones at the state level, justice among different states shouldn't 
be undermined and important common issues (e.g. global poverty, migration, 
violation of human rights, climate change, and environmental dangers) must be 
addressed, especially in today's globalized world. Hence, I will start from the 
assumption that we can look at the world as a ''global community'', an entity 
suitable for the application of interpretations of distributive justice. According to 
Paul G. Harris, the world is a community made up of states that are part of 
complex international economic, cultural and political relations, and therefore 
we can apply different formulations of justice to the world.10  
My aim here is to apply the principles of distributive justice to the 
international context of global climate change. The central distributive question 
that results from the international relationship between states is what is a just 
distribution of the benefits and burdens concerning some good. In this paper, 
specifically, the benefits and burdens of climate change, where the atmosphere 
                                                          
9Armstrong (2012), p. 16. 
10 Harris (1999), p. 12. 
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represents a global common good that must be allocated internationally, 
according to some distribution pattern.  
Before tackling this specific problem, I want to introduce another 
important distinction crucial for a better understanding of distributive justice and 
principles. Armstrong distinguishes between egalitarian and minimalist 
approaches to global distributive justice. First, as the very term suggests, an 
egalitarian approach puts emphasis on the notion of equality, as we can notice 
from the following quote: 
''It might specify that some important resource should be distributed  
equally between all people, or that people should at least have an 
equal chance to obtain it for themselves if they work hard enough... 
Some egalitarian accounts suggest that inequalities are sometimes 
acceptable, but try to specify and to place limits on the kinds of 
inequalities that are justified.''11 
We can see that several egalitarian accounts are existent in contemporary 
discussion on equality, but for the sake of the topic of this paper, I wish to 
underline the importance of two positions: first, the idea of strict equality (some 
good must be allocated equally amongst all) and second, the global equality of 
opportunity (no one should have worse opportunities to obtain some good 
because he or she was born in a disadvantaged country, i.e. nationality as a 
morally arbitrary characteristic should not be of any relevance in the distribution 
of a global good).12 We shall see later how these concepts are connected to the 
specific issue of climate change. 
  Secondly, a minimalist approach suggests that global injustice consists in 
the fact that some people don't have enough resources or goods to lead decent 
lives, i.e. the minimal conditions for meeting their basic human rights aren't 
                                                          
11 Armstrong (2012), p. 35. 
12 Ibid., p. 59. 
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fulfilled. As a human rights - oriented approach, it tolerates some global 
inequalities between countries: 
''Crucially, once the goal of securing a decent minimum for all is 
secured, inequalities in the distribution of various goods over and 
above that will not be condemned as unjust.''13 
Proponents of the minimalist approach to global justice claim that people's 
need to meet basic human rights can impose duties of distributive justice. 
Primary responsibility for securing the rights of individuals falls on the nation-
state. On the other side, in situations where human rights are violated, and a 
certain state fails at securing them, that responsibility is transferred to other 
states.14   
Bearing these two approaches in mind, how are we ought to distribute the 
burdens and benefits connected to the global problem of climate change? Should 
they be allocated equally among all the people in the world, or according to 
some other principle? Can some inequalities in distribution be justified in order 
to protect basic human rights? Before dealing with various positions concerning 
the principles of justice, I would like to introduce the problem of climate change 
and how exactly it is linked to the concept of distributive justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Armstrong (2012), p. 36. 
14 Ibid., p. 89., 90. 
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2.1. The problem of climate change and international inequity 
 
 According to the latest assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (2014), the main source of the scientific, technical and socio-
economic information regarding the understanding of human-induced climate 
change, the main problem consists in "anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
that have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and 
population growth, and are now higher than ever.''15 Also, according to IPCC,  
''(t)his has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years.''16  
The negative changes in our climate, as well as the environmental 
degradation, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in 
warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an 
increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions, are 
closely linked to human influences.17 We can see that human activities (e.g. 
burning of fossil fuels and the use of non-renewable energy sources that result in 
excessive emissions of waste gases) are essential causes of negative climate 
change effects. For example, the emissions of greenhouse gases in the rich 
industrialized countries usually have destructive effects on the environment of 
other, less developed parts of the world. According to Amstutz, we consider 
global warming, air pollution and other negative consequences to be collective 
″bads″. The harms of GHG emissions cannot be kept within one's national 
borders, but expand them and affect other societies across the globe. Conversely, 
clean air and environmental protection represent collective goods that also 
extend across borders and benefit everyone in the global community.18 For 
example, if global warming is reduced due to the cutting back of GHG 
                                                          
15 IPCC (2014), p. 4. 
16 Ibid., p. 4. 
17 Ibid., p. 7. 
18 Amstutz (2013), p. 249. 
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emissions in some countries, every other country in the world would benefit 
from that reduction.  
The key point that is indicated here is that the problem of climate change 
affects us all, no matter where we live, or when we are born. Thus, the actions of 
past persons have caused climate conditions that are present today, and our 
present actions will affect future generations and their lives. In that manner, the 
question of international justice and what distribution of the benefits and 
burdens is fair can also have another dimension concerning intergenerational 
justice and conflict between people's current needs and the claims of future 
generations. Therefore, distributive justice in the environmental context has a 
spatial dimension (justice among present actors), as well as a temporal 
dimension (justice among the past, present and future generations). I find these 
two dimensions to be closely interconnected when discussing distributive 
principles. Later I will tackle this issues more when referring to GHG emissions 
from the past. 
Now I wish to point to the moral challenge of global climate change. 
Marc R. Amstutz argues that the moral challenge consists in balancing national 
interests with shared global concerns, and a moral approach to the problem of 
combating the climate change must ensure that access to the global commons is 
fair and that the distribution of the commons‘ resources is perceived as just. 
Furthermore, he says that this challenge is substantially problematic because of 
different perceptions of political and economic reality by decision makers, but 
more importantly for the main issue of this paper, they also hold different 
conceptions of justice (what distribution of climate change burdens and benefits 
is fair).19  It is important to indicate the fundamental tenet on which the climate 
change policies are designed. UNFCCC (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change), an international environmental treaty, together 
                                                          
19 Amstutz (2013), p. 248.-249.  
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with the Kyoto Protocol, established the international principle of the protection 
of the climate system 'on the basis of equity and in accordance with common, 
but differentiated responsibilities, and respective capabilities' to be the main 
principle of climate change regime with an objective to 'stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human 
interference with the climate system.'20 Nevertheless, there are certain 
difficulties that complicate the design and implementation of a fair climate 
change regime and policies in the international community.  
Namely, they are primarily normative challenges posed by three main 
inequities involved in the causes and effects of climate change and manifested in 
the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South, 
illustrated by Steve Vanderheiden.  He states first concern to be the relative 
causal responsibility of nations, meaning that some nations are more responsible 
than others for contributing to climate change, due to varying levels of economic 
and technological development related to greenhouse gas emissions, which we 
had already seen to be the most problematic human-induced causes of change in 
climate. Secondly, another international inequity manifests itself in the some 
nations' greater economic capabilities to undertake large-scale GHG reduction 
projects. And third inequity refers to the predicted harmful effects of climate 
change, which will primarily be borne by poorer developing nations, that are 
less causally responsible and have the lesser capability (financial resources) to 
undertake mitigation and adaptation projects.21 As it is estimated in IPCC's 
report:  
"Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for 
natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are 
                                                          
20 UNFCCC (1992), p. 4. 
21 Vanderheiden (2008), p. 82. 
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generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in 
countries at all levels of development."22   
Here we can notice several notions that are mentioned, and that are of 
great importance for the later discussion, such as 'responsibility' and 'capability'. 
Moral responsibility for the negative effects of climate change is also considered 
something to be justly distributed. Various commentators that discuss 
distributive justice in the context of climate change, tend to refer to different 
things that they consider to be a matter of distribution. In general, that are 
benefits and burdens of some kind. Are those benefits caused by GHG emission 
activities? Or rights to emit waste gases? Are those the costs either of mitigation 
or adaptation when amending harmful climate change effects? Or does the 
distribution refer to the allocation of the atmosphere's limited capacity to absorb 
GHG? With an aim to clarify this issue, in the next section, I will determine on 
what exactly I will be referring to as the main subject of distributive justice in 
the context of climate change.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 IPCC (2014), p. 13. 
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3. Distribution of what and among whom? 
 
I think it is very useful to focus the attention on four questions adduced by 
Simon Caney, which aim at determining the scope of international justice. These 
are the following: 
''(1) What sorts of entities are included within systems of distributive      
      justice (humans, all sentient creatures, collective entities such as states     
     or nations)? 
(2) Who are the rightful recipients of goods, and who is obligated to   
      distribute these goods? 
(3)  What should people have fair shares of (income, happiness)? 
(4)  According to what criterion of distributive justice should goods be      
      distributed (equality, according to the desert, or the market)?''23 
 
In this section, I will address questions (1) and (3), and later on (2) and 
(4), as they are closely linked to the subject of distributive principles, but in the 
context of environmental justice. Regarding (1), Caney poses the central 
question in the following way: what is the relevant unit of analysis? And in 
relation to the global climate change, who is the main actor of pollution and 
emission of GHG, i.e. among whom should the benefits and burdens of climate 
change be distributed? Are there one or more entities, and which of these play 
the greatest role?24 In dealing with this issue, he states few possibilities as 
probable answers: (a) individuals – for example, individuals use electricity for 
heating and consume fossil fuels by driving cars and in that manner are 
responsible for GHG emission; (b) economic corporations – e.g. they consume 
vast amounts of fossil fuels and bring about deforestation; (c) states – many 
                                                          
23 Caney (2005), p. 103. 
24 Caney (2005), p. 754. 
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authors consider nation-states to be the main unit of analysis in a sense that they 
decide on whether a country should cut back on GHG emissions or not; (d) 
international regimes and institutions – some argue that the causes of climate 
change should not be traced to 'states' or 'countries' but rather to international 
institutions, that by promoting economic growth encourage countries to engage 
in GHG emission activities.25  
So, who of these four actors should be considered to be the main polluter 
and bear responsibility for climate change? Caney differentiates between two 
main approaches - the individualist and the collectivist position and endorses the 
individualist one. Hence, he argues that individuals are basic units for allocating 
responsibility for GHG emissions and thinks that one position excludes the 
other. Conversely, Paul G. Harris criticizes the standard 'among countries' view 
and argues that a discussion about fair global distribution should not be 
restricted to nation-state actors, nor to individuals, as in the Caney's case. 
Moreover, it should take into account different groupings of people, such as 
non-governmental and international organizations, multinational corporations, as 
well as individuals overall.26 He asserts the reason for that to be the fact that the 
world is comprised of diverse actors that relate to one another in various 
complex, cross-cutting and cooperative ways that have a significant influence on 
the course of international relations, analogous to the relations between 
individuals in the domestic realm.27 We can see that Caney, for example, focuses 
only on individuals as the relevant unit of analysis, and Harris takes into account 
all the subjects responsible for negative climate change effects.  
Various commentators have referred to different entities and 
consequently, the notions of distributive principles tend to apply to distinct 
actors, as we shall see later on. For this reason, I don't want to support strictly 
individualist nor collectivist approach, but will in that respect refer to two 
                                                          
25 Caney (2005), p. 754., 755. 
26 Harris (1999), p. 7. 
27 Ibid., p. 7. 
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distinct entities. On the one hand, individuals, as actors who have certain rights 
regarding the benefits connected to global climate change, and on the other, 
nation-states, i.e. countries as crucial actors in international relations with a 
corresponding institution, i.e. a government with an important role of decision-
making. Taking this into account, every individual has a right to his or her share 
of the atmosphere as a common good and is responsible for pollution while 
using its capacity to absorb waste gases. In addition to this, his or her right to 
GHG emission can be limited by a state's decision to cut back on GHG 
emissions. This 'twofold approach' that encompasses individual actors, as well 
as nation-states, is nicely illustrated in the next citation: ''Justice ought to be 
aimed at individuals, but states are the mediators that act to achieve it.''28  
Regarding (3), the issue at stake is what exactly should people/states have 
fair shares of? We must determine the exact good to which we will apply 
principles of distributive justice. In the context of climate change, authors again 
diverge when it comes to defining the subject of distribution. At this point, it is 
important to precisely define what kind of good is the atmosphere, and in what 
way does it, for example, differ from a stable climate. This distinction is nicely 
described by Christian Baatz & Konrad Ott.29 According to them, the difference 
is evident in terms of two conditions: excludability and rivalry. The atmosphere, 
understood as the limited earth's capacity to absorb greenhouse gases and other 
pollutants, represents: 
 
''A global commons which is non-excludable but rival in use: when 
it is provided to some others cannot be prevented from consuming 
the good as well (non-excludability) and consumption of the good 
by some constraints the consumption of others (rivalry).''30 
                                                          
28 Harris (1999), p. 9. 
29 Baatz & Ott (2015)  
30 Baatz & Ott (2015), p. 2. 
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But, if we successfully prevent negative impacts of climate change, Baatz 
& Ott argue that we have realized a new good, i.e. a protected or stable climate. 
It differs from the atmosphere regarding the rivalry condition. 
''Consumption of this good is non-rival and non-excludable. Others 
cannot be prevented from benefiting from a stable climate and 
consumption of some does not inhibit the consumption of others.''31 
In this respect, stable climate falls under the category of public goods 
(non-excludability and non-rivalry), as typical examples like national defence or 
roads. Although the atmosphere's limited ability to absorb GHG (global 
commons) represents an important aspect of the discussion on distribution, this 
is a too simplistic way to approach the issue of distributive justice regarding 
global climate change. As we have already seen, distribution has to pertain to 
the benefits and burdens connected to the allocated good. The atmosphere 
provides us with benefits (while using its capacity, we produce goods which 
benefit us), as well as burdens (in order to maintain it's ability to absorb our 
GHG, we have to cope with different burdens). So, what these benefits and 
burdens might be? For example, Lukas H. Meyer and Dominic Roser argue that 
the answer to this question are emissions, or to be more precise tradable 
emissions rights. In connection with this, the goods to which we apply 
distributive principles refer to the benefits from emissions, i.e. the use of 
emission rights.32 They go on stating that:  
''(E)mitting itself is not beneficial but rather the activities – such as 
industrial production or the flights into vacation – which have as 
their necessary by-product emissions. It would thus be still more 
precise to speak of benefits from emission generating activities.''33  
                                                          
31 Baatz & Ott (2015), p. 3. 
32 Meyer & Roser (2006), p. 227. 
33 Ibid., p. 227. 
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Other authors, such as Harris, write about the benefits and burdens linked 
to environmental pollution caused by human-induced environmental changes. 
As examples of benefits, he cites the protection from harmful ultraviolet light 
from the sun, as well as benefits associated with international agreements, 
financial aid by the Multilateral Fund, technology transfers on preferential terms 
and extensions in emissions schedules, etc. On the other side, there are burdens 
connected to climate changes, and Harris emphasizes the following ones: the 
harmful effects of ozone depletion (e.g. skin cancers, damage to agriculture and 
fisheries) that are more severe in poor developing countries; direct costs 
associated with ozone-destroying chemical emissions reductions, and 
restrictions on the beneficial uses of ozone-destroying chemicals, also in larger 
part felt by developing states.34 
Furthermore, Caney defines the subject of distributive justice in terms of 
the distinction of two kinds of burdens imposed by climate change. First, 
mitigation burdens, that designate the costs to actors of not engaging in emission 
activities which cause harmful effects of climate change. For example, 
mitigation involves cutting back on activities like the burning of fossil fuels, 
using of cars, electricity, and air flight, as well as investing in other energy 
resources, such as renewable energy. And second, adaptation burdens, that 
represent the costs to actors of adopting measures which enable them to cope 
with the negative and harmful effects of climate change.35  
We can notice that various thinkers define the scope of international 
distributive justice concerning the climate change in a slightly different way, but 
what they generally agree on is that the subject of distribution refers to certain 
benefits and burdens, as is commonly discussed in general theories of global 
justice. So, similarly to the previous 'twofold approach' regarding responsible 
actors, here we have a resembling state of affairs. In the following text, where I 
                                                          
34 Harris (1999), p. 9. 
35 Caney (2005), p. 751., 752. 
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will revolve the discussion around the principles of distributive justice, I will 
address next two aspects of climate change distributive issue: first, the allocation 
of tradable emissions rights to use the remaining atmosphere's capacity to 
absorb waste gases; and secondly, the distribution of the costs of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. I think that the benefits related to climate change are 
most comprehensible in terms of emissions rights because all other benefits 
come with the utilization of those rights. When it comes to climate change 
burdens, I think it is useful to refer to the costs of mitigation and adaptation, as 
they clearly correspond to emissions reduction activities. Also, distributive 
principles have to ascribe certain entitlements and duties to responsible actors. 
With respect to that, entitlements are frequently manifested in some kind of 
rights that humans possess, and duties in international relations often represent 
the costs and financial obligations of rich countries to the poor ones. In the 
section that follows, I shall present some general notions and concepts 
underlying the discussion of distributive principles, and then try to apply those 
principles in the context of global climate change.  
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4. Time-slice and historical principles 
 
Relevant for the discussion about justice in the climate change context, an 
important distinction should be mentioned, presented by Robert Nozick in his 
seminal work Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and that is between historical and 
time-slice distributive principles. According to Nozick, conception of 
distributive justice can be historical, where whether a distribution is just depends 
upon how it came about, or it can refer to current time-slice principles of justice, 
which hold that the justice of a distribution is determined by how things are 
distributed (who has what) as judged by some structural principle of just 
distribution. Thus, when determining if a distribution is just, we can either look 
how the situation came about (take notice of the historical background of it) or 
question if the existing distribution satisfies the specific principle of fairness at a 
particular point in time.36  
Having in mind this distinction, we can raise a question what 'type' of 
distributive principle is more convenient for applying to the climate change 
context? Or, which principle is 'more competent' in realizing a fair distribution 
of climate change benefits and burdens? I would like to start the discussion by 
referring to the established international principle of ’common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ of the UNFCCC, as well as regulations from the Kyoto 
Protocol, which determined that:  
"(I)ndustrialized countries reduce their greenhouse emissions by 
about 5 percent below their 1990 level no later than the year 2012. 
To achieve this goal, the protocol established significant cuts in 
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pollution – 8 percent for the European Union, 7 percent for the 
United States, and 6 percent for Japan."37 
 Developed countries were assigned the biggest cuts in pollution because 
they are considered to be the greatest polluters. On the contrary, developing 
countries such as China and India weren't assigned any binding targets, and in 
that way, the Kyoto framework imposed a great burden on rich industrialized 
states and their energy consumption patterns, especially on the US, that is 
considered to be the biggest polluter.38 The justification for such decision is the 
fact that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high 
levels of GHG in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial 
activity.39 Since the Industrial Revolution, some countries developed more, and 
as a result, produced more GHG, while others achieved much weaker economic 
growth, as well as emitted GHG far less. This inequality continued to the present 
day and many policy makers try to amend it, i.e. reduce the overall GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere, while at the same time, meet every nation‘s 
wants and needs. This is a quite challenging assignment, as there are different 
requirements for reducing carbon emissions for developed and developing 
nations.  
The question arises: how exactly should we allocate responsibility for 
harmful climate change effects and the burdens (costs of GHG mitigation and 
adaptation) among developed nations of the North and the developing nations of 
the South? Some think that historical moral responsibility for GHG emissions 
from the past must be taken into consideration when distributing the burdens of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Others are inclined to argue that this 
approach is not suitable and that we should introduce the concept of equality 
into this debate in order to make distribution more just. 
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So, a philosophical position that resembles the decision of the 
international community (as the one from the Kyoto Protocol) to place unequal 
duties of justice on developed and developing states, takes into consideration 
past emissions and polluters. Hence, some philosophers (e.g. Shue40, 
Neumayer41, Caney42, Baatz43) support historical-accountability approach, or the 
'polluter pays' principle (PPP), which "offers a responsibility-based account of 
the proper distribution of costs: those who are responsible for causing the 
problem through their historical emissions are the ones that should pay, and in 
proportion to those historical emissions."44 
They argue that developing states should be granted higher emissions 
rights on grounds of developed countries' greater historical responsibility for 
GHG emissions. Accordingly, the developed nations should bear greater 
responsibility for combating climate change with respect to the mitigation of its 
harmful effects and adaptation, i.e. dealing with the costs of GHG reduction. 
Simply put by Caney: 
''Those who have caused a problem (such as pollution) should foot 
the bill. In other words, the key principle is that 'the polluter should 
pay'.''45  
According to Vanderheiden, UNFCCC acknowledges that 75 percent of 
past GHG emissions is caused by the world's developed industrialized countries. 
Thus, the PPP tells us they ought to be allocated primary responsibility for 
amending the harmful climate change effects.46 The industrialized nations of the 
North must shoulder much greater mitigation and adaptation burdens, but still, 
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that doesn't exempt other poorer countries from the commitment to reduce GHG 
emissions. They have to shoulder less burden, as a consequence of a lesser 
causal responsibility for pollution.  
 Nevertheless, this model has been criticized that binding targets for GHG 
emission imposed significant economic burdens on the developed nations. Some 
thinkers hold that the PPP is not just because it places unequal burdens on 
different countries and in that way deprives certain individuals of their fair share 
of the atmosphere. According to the most commonly advocated time-slice 
principle, and that is equal per capita emissions shares (Singer47, Baer48), every 
individual should have a right to an equal share of the atmosphere’s capacity to 
absorb greenhouse gases, while past GHG emissions and polluters are ignored. 
A crucial thing to notice are the different approaches of a historical 
account and equal per capita shares to the subject of global distributive justice. 
Thus, historical accountability approach centres the debate on the allocation of 
the climate-induced burdens (the costs of mitigation and adaptation) between 
developed and developing countries, while equal per capita shares approach 
focuses on the distribution of emissions rights between individuals and the 
division of a remaining capacity of the atmosphere to absorb GHG. They differ 
in this respect due to diversity and complexity of the issues linked to the realm 
of global climate change. Accordingly with that, various normative principles 
(or a combination of several principles) could be applied to different aspects of 
climate change issue. I shall examine each of the two mentioned 
approaches/principles respectively and try to show that historical responsibility 
approach is a better solution to the problem of global climate change, as opposed 
to equal per capita shares approach. Thus, I will argue that equality does not 
indicate an adequate criterion for the distribution of climate change benefits and 
burdens. Also, while I do not want to deny every individual's equal right to a 
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global commons such as the atmosphere, I argue that questions of just 
distribution shouldn't be founded on such a principle separated from historical 
reasons that have influenced present unjust distribution.  
 
4.1. Equal per capita shares vs. historical accountability approach 
 
It is generally thought that every human being should have a right to an 
equal share of the atmosphere’s absorbing capacity as it is a global common 
good belonging to all humans, irrespective of one's national affiliation. It seems 
self-evident that neither particular individual should have a larger share of this 
common good than others. But clearly, this is not the case in today’s world 
where "the wealth of the developed nations is inextricably tied to their 
prodigious use of carbon fuels (a use that began more than 200 years ago and 
continues unchecked today), and it is a small step from here to the conclusion 
that the present global distribution of wealth is the result of the wrongful 
expropriation by a small fraction of the world's population of a resource that 
belongs to all human beings."49  
So, when talking about concerns linked to equality in the context of 
climate change, we generally think of an unequal use or misuse of a global 
commons– specifically, the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb human-produced 
greenhouse gases (e.g. carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide), which 
destroy ozone layer necessary for the protection of the earth and environment 
from the damaging influence of sun’s rays. The issue at stake is that this global 
common good is not equally distributed among the world’s individuals. And 
still, the atmosphere is considered to be a common good and no person can be 
excluded from using it. On the other hand, we have already said that besides 
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non-excludability, what characterizes the atmosphere is that it is rival in 
consumption. The problem arises when we have a limited earth's sink capacity 
to absorb GHG, i.e. a definite amount of acceptable gas emissions can be 
tolerated. Baatz & Ott even claim that the feature of non-excludability is 
controversial for the following reason: 
''This seems to indicate that the respective good is not a pure global 
commons because others can be excluded to use the good to a 
certain extent under a regulatory scheme.''50 
International conventions and regulations on climate change can impose certain 
entitlements and duties on countries in terms of a determined amount of GHG 
emissions either country is allowed to emit. These decisions also affect GHG 
emissions rights of individuals. The main question is: how should we decide to 
distribute the benefits of climate change in the form of emissions rights?   
As a representative of an equal per capita emissions rights approach, Peter 
Singer argues that ''everyone has the same claim to part of the atmospheric sink 
as everyone else.''51 Similarly, another supporter of this position Paul Baer 
argues that ''the central argument for equal per capita rights is that the 
atmosphere is a global commons, whose use and preservation are essential to 
human well-being.''52  Furthermore, regardless of historical responsibility, all 
countries must participate in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Here we can 
ask a question why should then emissions rights be assigned equal per capita, 
and not equal by country? Some hold that every country should have a right to 
an equal share of the atmosphere, but Baer gives us justificatory counter-
argument that this position isn’t plausible because the benefits of the use of the 
resource fundamentally accrue to people; the allocation of emissions rights to 
countries is a pragmatic compromise, and he states that no one would argue that 
                                                          
50 Baatz & Ott (2015), p. 2. 
51 Singer (2010), p. 190. 
52 Baer (2002), p. 401. 
  25 
 
some small country, such as Fiji, should have the same emissions rights as the 
big industrialized countries, such as the United States.53  
The essence of equal per capita shares approach is quite easy to grasp due 
to its simplicity – the rights to emit GHG should be distributed equally among 
all the people. The supporters of this view, such as Singer and Baer, think that 
the historical responsibility model of allocating the burdens of climate change to 
past big polluters is not the right solution because it puts a heavy burden on the 
developed nations. At first, their position sounds appealing because it allows 
developing countries such as China and India to increase their emissions with an 
aim to develop and 'catch up' the developed countries that are simultaneously 
obligated to decrease their GHG emissions. But we can notice that the objection 
directed to the historical account (that it is not favorable for developed nations) 
can also be valid for equal per capita shares approach.  
Singer and Baer are aware of the difficulty of applying strict equality to 
the distribution of permits to use the atmosphere's capacity to absorb GHG. 
Emphasized by Singer: 
"(T)he real objection to allocating the atmosphere's capacity to 
absorb greenhouse gases to nations on the basis of equal per capita 
shares is that it would be tremendously dislocating for the 
industrialized nations to reduce their emissions so much that within 
five, ten or fifteen years they were not producing more than their 
share, on a per capita basis, of some acceptable level of greenhouse 
gases."54  
Both philosophers suggest a mechanism of emissions trading as a solution 
to this objection, that is fully compatible with the equal per capita shares 
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principle. They argue that it can make the developed countries' big burdens of 
coping with climate change much easier while producing great benefits for the 
developing nations. It works in a way that countries with below-average GHG 
emissions are allowed to sell their emissions rights to countries with excessive 
levels of GHG pollution. That way rich countries gain more rights to emit GHG 
and developing countries receive needful financial support. This mechanism is 
actually implemented and various countries have adopted it.  
While it has quite a persuasive strength, it is not without its challenges. 
Amstutz asserts that the trade of emissions rights will be performed by 
governments. So, it is quite doubtful that the financial aid the poor countries 
would get from selling their emissions rights will benefit the most needful 
people of that countries. Also, the effort to reduce negative climate change 
effects becomes a part of the enormous global market, and every human's right 
to use the atmosphere becomes commercialized.55 In addition to this, Armstrong 
asserts another morally problematic aspect of emissions trading: 
''In some ways, we might think that the idea of emissions trading is 
morally suspect – because it allows the wealthy to continue 
polluting far too much, just because they can afford to buy rights 
from the poor – rights which they cannot use at present because 
they are poor and 'under-developed'.''56  
After all, it is questionable whether poor societies would in that way have a 
requisite opportunity to develop in the same manner as industrialized countries 
did in the past. I think that this weaknesses and uncertainties linked to the 
mechanism of emissions trading represent a significant challenge for the time-
slice principle of equal per capita shares.  
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Another challenge is introduced by Stephen M. Gardiner. He argues that 
per capita shares approach doesn't take into account the fact that GHG emissions 
may play very different roles in people's lives, may vary over time (with the 
existing technology), as well as the need for them depends on the available 
alternatives. Additionally, he distinguishes between emissions that are used to 
produce luxury items and the ones that are necessary for most people's survival, 
i.e. subsistence emissions. 57 It is unquestionable that people should have rights 
to the minimum emissions necessary to sustain their lives. But, what about 
luxury emissions and how they ought to be distributed? Gardiner claims that 
''(t)he guaranteed minimum principle does not imply that allocation of any 
remaining emissions rights above those necessary for subsistence must be made 
on a per capita basis. The guaranteed minimum view is distinct from a more 
robust egalitarian position which demands equality of a good at all levels of its 
consumption, hence, above the minimum some other criterion might be 
adopted.''58  
We might argue that regarding the so-called 'luxury emissions', poor 
developing countries should be granted greater emissions rights, reflecting their 
greater needs and a right to develop. On the other hand, rich developed countries 
should be assigned less rights to emit GHG, due to their past emissions. But, 
before examining the historical account, i.e. the polluter pays principle (PPP) as 
an alternative solution to the distributive issues of climate change, I want to 
show how equal per capita emissions shares approach is flawed in a meaningful 
way. Namely, it has been criticized to be inappropriately atomist. As a starting 
point for an explanation of atomism in this context, I would like to introduce 
Baatz & Ott's account of equal per capita shares approach, emissions 
egalitarianism (EE), but which does not differ in any significant way from 
already described time-slice principle. In this paper's introductory part on global 
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distributive justice, I have mentioned an egalitarian approach to global 
distributive justice, and equal per capita emissions shares falls under this broader 
theory of justice since it adverts to equality as the normative time-slice principle 
for the distribution of emissions rights. So, the argument for EE is structured in 
the following way: 
''(P1) The atmosphere is a global commons. 
 (P2) A global commons is owned by everyone equally. 
 (P3) If a global commons is owned by everyone equally, the right     
to use it should (pro tanto) be distributed equally amongst all. 
 (C) The right to use the atmosphere should (pro tanto) be  
distributed equally amongst all.''59 
The third premise is problematic because it is only plausible if we endorse 
atomist position, which I think is not appropriate one for the climate change 
context. The aim of EE is to distribute emissions rights, but as Baatz & Ott 
argue, it fails in dealing with the burdens of climate change, by which they refer 
to the costs of mitigation and adaptation. The burdens of climate change seem to 
be too important to be neglected, so we can rephrase the third premise: 
''(P') If a global commons is owned by everyone equally, the costs 
related to its (over-)use and maintenance should be distributed 
equally amongst all.''60 
Here Baatz & Ott refer to mitigation and adaptation as two different 
realms of climate change that should be addressed separately. Thus, EE could 
account for the costs associated with mitigation because when we determine a 
cap on total GHG emission output in terms of assigning equal per capita 
emissions shares, we act in view of reducing the engagement in activities that 
produce GHG. But on the other side, EE doesn't give us a solution to the 
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question of distribution of the costs of adaptation. 61 It seems unreasonable to 
assert that the costs of amending the negative effects of climate change should 
fall on developed and developing countries equally. 
In that respect equal per capita shares approach is considered to be 
atomistic. It does not consider all the relevant aspects of climate change, 
including the costs of both mitigation and adaptation. If we take a holist position 
(a principle or a combination of principles should apply to all the realms of 
climate change), then it is difficult to defend emissions egalitarianism as an 
appropriate approach to distributive issues of climate change.62 Thus, Baatz and 
Ott's conclusion is that ''it is very unlikely that future emissions entitlements 
ought to be distributed equally when costs for adaptation and rectification are 
included.''63  
So, is there some better solution to these difficulties, and more acceptable 
distribution principle regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation? I 
don’t want to disclaim every person’s equal right to the use of global common 
goods such as the atmosphere, but I think that equality isn’t favorable solution 
for the just distribution of climate change burdens. Also, equal per capita shares 
approach ignores past GHG emissions, as well as benefits and burdens 
associated with them. This is also an important intergenerational aspect of 
climate change that has to be addressed.  
An alternative approach to these issues, that I have already mentioned 
before, is historical accountability approach, i.e. the polluter pays principle. It 
takes into account polluter’s historical responsibility. For example, Henry Shue 
justifies the historical responsibility model of fairness with the following 
formulation of principle of equity:  
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"When a party has in the past taken an unfair advantage of others by 
imposing costs upon them without their consent, those who have 
been unilaterally put at a disadvantage are entitled to demand that in 
the future the offending party shoulder burdens that are unequal at 
least to the extent of the unfair advantage previously taken, in order 
to restore equality."64  
So, present inequality in putting greater binding targets for richer 
countries is justified with their greater historical liability for past GHG 
emissions. As Shue argues, applying this principle to the problem of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, it would mean that those countries whose 
activities have damaged the atmosphere ought to bear sufficiently unequal 
burdens to amend the inequality that they have caused. Nevertheless, in this 
case, everyone is bearing costs – because the damage is universal – but the 
primary duty-bearers for the costs of mitigation and adaptation are those who 
have become rich in the process.65  
We can see how inequality in this specific context doesn’t necessarily 
have to designate a distributive principle to be unfair. Ignoring  the historical 
responsibility of rich countries, i.e. past polluters, would give them a licence to 
disadvantage the poorer countries. As though they aren't already in a 
disadvantaged position by being poor. In fact, I think that Eric Neumayer has 
given a crucial argument in favor of this position as he argues how the historical 
accountability is actually supported by the principle of equality of opportunity. 
With respect to that, his position can partially be considered egalitarian, but in a 
wholly different way from emissions egalitarianism. His position is expressed in 
the following quotation: 
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"(T)he natural absorptive capacity of the planet earth that allows for 
the decay of a certain amount of greenhouse gas emissions truly 
belongs to nobody and should, therefore, be equally assigned to 
everybody in order to give everybody equal opportunity to benefit 
from emissions. To ignore historical accountability would mean to 
privilege those who lived in the past in the developed countries and 
to discriminate against those who live in the present or will live in 
the future developing countries."66  
Chris Armstrong also argues in favor of global equality of opportunity. He 
asserts that if we support the view according to which individuals' lives should 
not start at a disadvantage because of his or her ethnicity or gender (as morally 
arbitrary features), then we ought to also support the view that someone who is 
born in Mozambique rather than Monaco shouldn't be at a disadvantage because 
of his or her nationality.67 Unfortunately, this is the case: 
''Being born into a poor country deals just as bad (and arbitrary) a 
blow to one's prospects as being born a serf rather than a lord used 
to in feudal times. If we object to the inequalities of feudalism, we 
should object to global inequalities of opportunity too.''68 
Indeed, although equal per capita shares approach in a way ''takes care'' of future 
generations to come and respects everyone's right to a common good, what 
about the violations of equal emissions rights of past persons? It seems that 
egalitarian response to climate change disregards past persons' equal 
opportunities for using the atmosphere and developing. Consequently, it puts 
present individuals from different countries in an unequal position, mostly 
unfavorable position of suffering detrimental effects of climate change. 
Irrespective of a certain attraction of equal per capita share principle in a sense 
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of ''its simplicity, hence its suitability as a political compromise and because it 
seems likely to increase global welfare''69, and the fact that it is more convenient 
for the rich countries, I think the past emissions and benefits produced by them 
shouldn’t be neglected. It is important to address this aspect of climate change, 
as well as take into consideration all the realms of climate-induced costs. I have 
argued that time-slice distributive principle, i.e. principle based on equality fails 
to do so. 
However, I don’t think merely the polluter pays principle is sufficient for 
the application in the context of climate change, but should be complemented 
with an additional principle. Before indicating a combination of principles in 
question, in the next section, I will be dealing with objections directed to the 
polluter pays principle. Thus, I will present three most common ones that are 
generally thought to represent a threat of holding developed countries 
responsible for pollution and GHG emissions in the past. I shall also argue that 
various philosophers respond to these objections in a successful way. 
 
4.2. Objections to the polluter pays principle 
 
First, Michael Grubb objects that past emissions enabled the development 
of public goods, such as modern medicine and better technologies, that have also 
raised living standards in developing countries and made it easier for them to 
gain the same living standards with fewer emissions.70 This means that some of 
the benefits of previous GHG emissions aren’t restricted to developed nations 
that have emitted those GHG. Here we can make an analogy with Adam Smith's 
theory of an ''invisible hand'' and the justification of the rich countries' right to 
their wealth, described by Peter Singer. Smith thinks that the rich don't deprive 
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the poor of their ''portion'' of the world's wealth because they divide with the 
poor the products of all their improvements, i.e. they spread their wealth 
throughout the economy. He justifies his position with a principle of an 
''invisible hand'' that distributes goods 'nearly the same' as it would have if a 
principle of equality had distributed those goods.71 This analogy is not 
successful in supporting the posed challenge to the historical responsibility 
approach because of the following reason: 
''...many of the world's poorest people, whose shares of the 
atmosphere's capacity have been appropriated by the industrialized 
nations, are not able to partake in the benefits of this increased 
productivity in the industrialized nations - they cannot afford to buy 
its products - and if rising sea levels inundate their farmlands, or 
cyclones destroy their homes, they will be much worse off than they 
would otherwise have been.''72 
 
Also, with an average American who uses more than 15 times as much of 
the atmosphere's limited capacity to absorb GHG as the average Indian, it can be 
clearly seen how the rich effectively deprive the poor of an equal opportunity to 
develop in manner rich countries once did in the past.73 Eric Neumayer responds 
to the posed objection as well. He argues that it is difficult to measure the exact 
emissions shares which we wish to attribute to the provision of the public goods 
such as medicine and technology, that developed countries have benefited from. 
In addition to this, he stresses that the most benefits from emissions activities 
have contributed to the developed countries and not to the rest of the world, 
especially not to under-developed and poor parts.74  
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The second objection is generally known as the 'objection from 
ignorance.' It says that people in the past were unaware of the harmful effects of 
their GHG emissions. This objection implies that someone can be blamed for an 
act only if he or she has the knowledge of the effects this act produces. Singer’s 
version of this objection is made in the statement that at the time when the 
developed nations emitted the largest amount of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere, they couldn’t know the limits to the atmosphere’s capacity to 
absorb those gases.75 But, Neumayer refutes it by giving several notions. The 
first warning of global warming dates back to the last century and it is fair to say 
that it was not before the mid-1980s that the public and decision-makers became 
aware of the greenhouse effect.76 This claim can additionally be supported by 
the line from the IPCC assessment report:  
"Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been 
observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked 
to human influences."77  
In response to this ’objection from ignorance‘, Neumayer further argues 
that historical accountability approach isn't aiming at putting moral blame or 
guilt on present generations for what their ancestors have done in the past. It 
does not even require from responsible actors that they had to be consciously 
and deliberately aware of the harmful effects that they had caused concerning a 
shared global commons- the atmosphere.78 The historical account just tries to 
amend present inequities linked to the global climate change by assigning 
greater responsibilities and duties on the rich developed countries because they 
have exploited earth's sink capacity in excessive ways in the past. It is a matter 
of their compensation for ''taking'' more shares than it actually belonged to them 
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while disrupting poor societies' equal opportunity to use a global commons that 
is supposed to belong to all the humans, irrespective of their place and date of 
birth. Similarly, Henry Shue argues that the objection from ignorance identifies 
punishment for an action and being held responsible for an action. Namely, it is 
unfair to punish someone for actions they couldn't have known were negative. 
But, it is not unfair to make them amend those negative effects because they 
caused the problem.79  
We can make an analogy between holding past polluters accountable for 
present climate change effects on the one side, and a situation of affirmative 
action on the other. Affirmative action in most cases takes a form of a positive 
discrimination where some disadvantaged groups, due to historical reasons (e.g. 
slavery), are favored in certain areas of social cooperation. For example, a quota 
system can be used to secure a certain number of job vacancies for African-
Americans in the US due to their historical suffering from discrimination and 
oppression. Present generation's white members are not directly guilty for their 
ancestors' wrongdoings. Nevertheless, they enjoy certain benefits that arose 
from that actions. Thus, they can be held accountable for today's disadvantaged 
position of African-Americans and affirmative action represents a mechanism 
for a rectification of the produced damages. If we accept affirmative action as a 
fair approach to social justice, we should also support the polluter pays principle 
according to which we hold developed countries accountable for negative 
impacts of climate change, that are largely felt in poor countries. Accordingly, 
we ought to impose greater duties of dealing with climate-induced costs of 
mitigation and adaptation on those rich societies. 
Finally, there is a 'problem of past generations'. Paul Baer asserts that it is 
dubious to hold living persons responsible for the activities of their ancestors.80 
In other words, people that are currently alive shouldn't be considered 
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responsible for the actions of their ancestors, that have caused the harmful 
climate change effects. Who is then responsible and who should pay the costs of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation when the polluter isn't alive anymore? 
Eric Neumayer opposes this objection by asserting that "fundamental counter-
argument against not being held accountable for emissions undertaken by past 
generations is that the current developed countries readily accept the benefits 
from past emissions in the form of their high standard of living and should 
therefore not be exempted from being held accountable for the detrimental side-
effects with which their living standards were achieved."81  
This reply is known as the 'beneficiary pays' principle (BPP), that 
represents a slightly different interpretation of the PPP. It is examined in more 
detail by Christian Baatz. He admits that with respect to this objection, the scope 
of the PPP is limited. While it gives satisfying perspective in the intra-
generational context, it does not do so within the intergenerational one. He also 
claims that it is very demanding to justify the position according to which we 
hold nations or people responsible for GHG emissions since the industrial 
revolution, as anthropogenic climate change can be traced to the 250 years in the 
past.82 He goes on stating that we can more easily account for the developed 
countries' obligation to compensate negatively affected members in poor 
societies since 1990 due to the appropriation of their fair shares (when we can 
claim with certainty that climate change is in part human-induced). The problem 
arises when we must address damages caused by GHG emissions before 1990, 
the ones which cannot be associated with the resources raised from present 
generations and according to the polluter pays principle.83 So, with the 
beneficiary pays principle, Baatz defends the position that present people and 
states could be liable for their ancestors' emissions and that compensation might 
                                                          
81 Neumayer (2000), p. 189. 
82 Baatz (2012), p. 5. 
83 Ibid., p. 6. 
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be due even if the harmful effects were not caused by the agent herself.84 He has 
also given a specific definition of BPP that can be summarized in the following 
way:  
''In case agent A performs action X that harms agent C,  
agent B is under an obligation to compensate C, if: 
(i) C’s harm cannot be (fully) addressed by the responsibilities of A 
(who might be dead, unable or inhuman), 
(ii) B receives a net-benefit from X. 
B has to compensate until:  
(a) further payments would make B fall 
below a sufficiency threshold, 
(b) B has delivered all her net-benefit,  
(c) C’s harm is fully compensated.''85 
 
For now, I find the BPP to be a satisfying principle for the distribution of 
responsibilities for GHG emissions and accompanying costs of mitigation and 
adaptation. Intuitively, it has a strong appeal and I think it successfully responds 
to the crucial intergenerational problem for the polluter pays principle in its 
original form. However, I would like to mention one more worry about taking a 
historical approach as the only way of dealing with the distribution of 
environmental responsibilities. As indicated by Caney, historical accountability 
approach may be unfair for the currently poor states. If we consider a country 
that has in the past caused a great deal of pollution but remains impoverished, 
we might argue that it shouldn't bear the burdens of paying the costs for its 
pollution. Thus, the PPP/BPP seem unfair in that they ask too much of the poor 
                                                          
84 Baatz (2012), p. 6. 
85 Ibid., p. 8. 
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polluters.86 In the following section, I will present an answer to this problem by 
introducing a complementary principle- an ability to pay principle. 
 
 
4.3. Ability to pay principle 
 
In most cases interconnected with the greater historical responsibility 
comes the greater capability of a country to reduce GHG emissions and cope 
with the burdens of mitigation and adaptation. According to Vanderheiden, that 
capability denotes "a function of national wealth, current GHG emission 
patterns, and potential for improvement in energy and transportation 
infrastructure."87 It is generally thought that what makes one country more 
capable of reducing GHG emissions than another are financial resources and 
economic wealth.  
With respect to this, the additional principle of equity that should 
complement the polluter pays principle is greater capability, i.e. ability to pay. I 
will present three formulations of it. First, I will examine Simon Caney's so-
called 'hybrid account', and secondly, describe Henry Shue's proposal and the 
one of David Miller. My aim then is to show that their positions present the most 
satisfying solution to the distributive issue of global climate change, in view of 
the fact that they fall under the minimalist approach to global justice (human 
rights-based approach). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 Caney (2005), p. 763. 
87 Vanderheiden (2008), p. 73. 
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4.3.1. Caney's hybrid account 
  
Contrary to egalitarian approach to global distributive justice, Simon 
Caney supports minimalist approach and claims that people's need to meet basic 
human rights can impose duties of distributive justice. Thus, he constructs his 
'hybrid account' theory in regard to the notions of human rights and duties, i.e. 
obligations to others. In addition to this, he contends that we can look at 
principles of distributive justice from two perspectives, an 'entitlement' 
perspective and a 'duty-bearer' perspective. While the former considers the 
reasons why people have rights to certain goods, the latter refers to reasons why 
people are obligated to others.88  
So, first, I will explain his human rights approach to the international 
distributive justice in the context of climate change problem. Caney grounds this 
approach on Joseph Raz's theory of rights and emphasizes the crucial role of 
human rights in the protection of human interests. To be clearer, he summarizes 
his perspective in the following assumption: 
''A person has a right to X when X is a fundamental interest that is 
weighty enough to generate obligations on others.''89 
According to him, climate change has the impact on persons' fundamental 
human rights, while endangering their basic interests. In what way? We can start 
from this assumption: 
''Persons have fundamental interests in not suffering from: 
(a) drought and crop failure; 
(b) heatstroke; 
(c) infectious diseases (such as malaria, cholera, and dengue); 
                                                          
88 Caney (2005), p. 111. 
89 Caney (2005), p. 767. 
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(d) flooding and the destruction of homes and infrastructure; 
(e) enforced relocation; and 
(f) rapid, unpredictable and dramatic changes to their natural, social and 
economic world.''90 
 
With this premise, he contends that ''persons have the human right not to 
suffer from the disadvantages generated by global climate change''91 and that 
that claim expresses a strong case in protecting basic human rights. How exactly 
does global climate change endangers key human rights? In his article Climate 
Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds, Caney argues that climate 
change jeopardizes three basic human rights: the human right to life (every 
person has a human right not to be "arbitrarily deprived of his life"), the human 
right to health (all persons have a human right that other people do not act so as 
to create serious threats to their health), and the human right to subsistence (all 
persons have a human right that other people do not act so as to deprive them of 
the means of subsistence).92  
In climate change context, he argues that dangerous climate change 
systematically undermines the widespread enjoyment of listed human rights. 
Also, climate scientists are definite that current and future climate change are 
partially caused by human activities. Thus, the threats to persons' human rights 
to life, health, and subsistence are also the products of other people.93  In that 
way, we come to the distributive implications of Caney's human-rights 
approach, related to allocating the costs involved in reducing negative climate 
change effects. Here we can again ask a central question of this paper: who has 
the duty to bear the burdens and costs of global climate change, i.e. what kind of 
form should the distribution of the duties take place in order to protect basic 
                                                          
90 Caney (2005), p. 768. 
91 Ibid., p. 768. 
92 Caney (2005), p. 166.,167.,168. 
93 Ibid., p. 169.  
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human rights threatened by climate change? Caney states four types of duties 
with an aim to defend his 'hybrid account' that relies on attributing additional 
principle to the PPP/BPP and that follow from previously mentioned 'human 
right not to suffer from the disadvantages generated by global climate change'. 
For the sake of the topic of this paper, I will mention the first three duties. They 
are: 
''(D1) All are under a duty not to emit greenhouse gases in excess of 
their quota. 
(D2) Those who exceed their quota (and/or have exceeded it since 
1990) have a duty to compensate others (through mitigation or 
adaptation) (a revised version of the ‘polluter pays’ principle). 
But what of GHG emissions arising from (i) previous generations; 
(ii) excusable ignorance; and (iii) polluters who cannot be made to 
pay? These, we recall, were the kinds of GHG emission that could 
not adequately be dealt with by a purely ‘polluter pays’ approach.''94 
 
His suggestion here is that we accept the following duty: 
''(D3) In the light of (i), (ii), and (iii) the most advantaged have a 
duty either to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in proportion to 
the harm resulting from (i), (ii), and (iii) (mitigation) or to address 
the ill-effects of climate change resulting from (i), (ii), and (iii) 
(adaptation) (an ability to pay principle).''95 
 
From this structured review of duties allocated to the actors involved in 
causing climate change, we can see in what way Caney defends his 'hybrid 
account', that is aimed at recognizing that the polluter pays approach needs to be 
complemented with the ability to pay approach. He does so by ascribing duties to 
                                                          
94 Caney (2005), p. 769. 
95 Ibid., p. 769. 
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the most advantaged and those whose human rights are mostly threatened 
shouldn't be asked to bear the responsibility and pay the costs of dealing with 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Similar responses are adduced by Shue 
and Miller.  
 
4.3.2. Shue's proposal and Miller's principle of equal sacrifice 
 
The ability to pay principle proposed by Henry Shue is formulated in the 
assertion that among the responsible actors who are bound to contribute to some 
common endeavour, those who have the most resources should contribute the 
most to the endeavour.96 Namely, if some country significantly contributed to 
the environment pollution and carbon concentration in the atmosphere, but is 
poor and has no financial resources to remedy this damage, then it would be 
unfair to demand that from that country. Instead, countries with greater ability to 
pay should help and give financial aid for the common goal of reducing GHG 
emissions.  
One more thing that he proposes is a progressive rate of payment- insofar 
as a party’s assets are greater, the rate at which the party should contribute to the 
enterprise in question also becomes greater.97 In this case, the richer the country, 
the greater financial contribution is supposed to be given for the climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Shue then states an objection that is usually raised 
against progressive rates of contribution- disincentive effects:  "If those who 
have more are going to lose what they have at a greater rate than those who have 
less, the incentive to come to have more in the first place will be much less than 
it would have been with a flat rate of contribution."98  
 
                                                          
96 Shue (1999), p. 537. 
97 Ibid., p. 537. 
98 Ibid., p. 538. 
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In other words, someone might not be as much productive if anything 
extra he or she produces could be deprived of their possession. Shue gives three 
notions to defend his theory and the equity principle formulated to justify 
unequal burdens. First, he is stating that being fair and providing incentives are 
two different matters, and there is no guarantee that whatever arrangement 
would provide the greatest incentives would also be fair. Secondly, concerns 
about incentives often arise when it is assumed that greatest production and 
unlimited growth are the ultimate goals of a country. It is evident that many 
current forms of production and growth are unsustainable and the last thing we 
should do is to give people reasons to consume as many resources as they can. 
And thirdly, there is an issue about means, which means that if we assume that 
our goal in specific circumstances is to stimulate more production of something 
we would have to ask ourselves: how much incentive is needed to stimulate that 
much production?99  
Shue draws up a conclusion based on the assumptions that there is already 
an existing inequality in the world and that the contributions for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation should be made by the richer countries.  
 
"(W)hatever needs to be done by wealthy industrialized states or by 
poor non-industrialized states about global environmental problems 
like ozone destruction and global warming, the costs should initially 
be borne by the wealthy industrialized states."100 
 
Furthermore, David Miller offers a similar but I would say a more 'radical' 
view than Shue. Namely, he concurs with Shue that wealthy industrialized states 
should ''pay the bill'' for pollution and climate change. But, differs in that he 
absolves poor countries of any responsibility for bearing the costs of climate 
                                                          
99 Shue (1999), p. 538.-539. 
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change. Accordingly, all acts of mitigation and adaptation should fall on the rich 
societies. Those societies that are facing 'endemic' poverty, should not be 
demanded to mitigate GHG emissions, but contrary to that, should  be allowed 
to increase their emissions.101 This part of his position seems to be pretty 
reasonable and I think he has a point here. According to him, ''richer countries 
should alone bear the costs of mitigating climate change, and that in so doing 
they should make equal sacrifices to their standards of living.''102 
Miller has been accused of endorsing partially egalitarian approach 
because he asserts that those who are capable of bearing the costs of mitigation 
and adaptation should do so in an equal manner. However, he is not referring to 
strict equality or equal per capita shares, for those emissions above the line of 
poor countries' approved subsistence emissions. He emphasizes 'equal sacrifices' 
and by this, he means that when total emissions reduction is set, contributions of 
different countries (that are not poor) should be according to the amounts that 
are equally costly to them. In that way, some countries will make larger GHG 
reductions and the other smaller.103 It seems that it resembles Shue's progressive 
rate of payment.  
I find Shue's and Miller's positions to be convincing because of their 
reference to the importance of preserving human rights. Climate change is a 
global phenomenon and it has to be dealt with collectively. Industries in 
developed countries are the biggest polluters, but negative effects are primarily 
borne by poor people and developing countries. When we oppose the existence 
of industries and their development in rich countries to peoples' survival and 
basic needs in the poor ones, I definitely think that the latter should take 
precedence over the former.  
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102 Ibid., p. 196. 
103 Ibid., p. 198. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 To conclude, the main focus of this paper was the central issue concerning 
the application of distributive principles to the problem of allocating common 
burdens and benefits of the human-induced climate change among state and 
non-state actors. I have presented some philosophical positions and views with 
an aim of determining which distribution is more just and which distributive 
principle, i.e. a combination of principles I deem to be most suitable for climate 
change problem. Thus, I have described equal per capita shares approach, as a 
part of the egalitarian response to global distributive justice and argued that this 
position is inferior to the minimalist approach, which underlines the importance 
of including the notion of human rights and preserving them.  
Global climate change raises a number of complex moral issues and 
questions and it is important to address them because global warming is not a 
problem of future generations. It is our problem as well and I think that the 
reduction and prevention of the negative impacts should be our main goal when 
combating climate change. We have seen that the consensus on the question of a 
fair allocation of international duties for such common endeavour is not easy to 
achieve. With respect to that, I think the main responsibility and correspondent 
duties should fall back on the rich countries of the world, both because of their 
greater historical liability and their advantaged position regarding financial 
resources and assets. By that, I don't mean that the poorer countries should give 
up on striving for more sustainable ways of living, but should have fewer 
responsibilities in amending negative effects for the reason that they are those 
who suffer from them in most cases.  
Thus, I support the view that the historical accountability approach, 
combined with an ability to pay principle gives the most appropriate solution for 
distributing the costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation. With an aim 
to propose the best solution for devising a fair climate change regime, I claim 
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that egalitarian approach is flawed in that it does not address all the important 
aspects of climate change issue and that minimalist account offers preferable 
answer to various obstacles in constructing and implementing a fair model for 
controlling climate change.  
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